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In their article “Ownership or Use? Civilian Property Interests in 
International Humanitarian Law,”1 Lea Brilmayer and Geoffrey Chepiga have 
attempted to identify a common purpose underlying the protection of civilian 
property under international humanitarian law (IHL). However, there is no such 
concept as “protected property” in IHL, and an approach to the protection of 
property and civilian goods has emerged from the application of the Geneva 
Conventions and other IHL instruments on a case-by-case basis.2   
Brilmayer and Chepiga argue that IHL conventions value property mainly for 
its importance in preventing civilian suffering, as opposed to its connection to “ideas 
of ownership.” In fact, this line of reasoning concerning the raison d’être of rules 
protecting property is confirmed by developments in the field of international 
criminal law (ICL). Many of the acts against civilian property envisaged in the Geneva 
Conventions were included in the grave breaches regime, thus paving the way for 
criminal prosecution of those allegedly responsible for their commission. The 
criminalization of attacks against civilian property, in particular those attacks carried 
out on a large scale and not justified by military necessity, does indeed reflect the 
need—and the will of the drafters—to protect the civilian population and to preserve 
                                                
1 Lea Brilmayer and Geoffrey Chepiga, Ownership or Use? Civilian Property Interests in International 
Humanitarian Law, 49 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 413 (2008). 
2 For an interesting view on this topic, see Bing Bing Jia, “Protected Property” and Its Protection in 
International Humanitarian Law, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 131–53  (2002). 
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the means for its survival, and not merely the economic or monetary value of the 
goods destroyed or seized.  
More recently, many provisions concerning war crimes against property were 
included in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), thus 
establishing a “civilian-use value” rationale for the protection of goods in times of 
war. The relevant provisions included in the ICTY Statute are rather few and concise,3 
but the ICC Statute includes five different rules directly criminalizing the 
expropriation or destruction of property. These rules include a prohibition on 
extensive destruction of both State and private property and pillaging both in 
international and non-international armed conflicts,4 as well as a number of other 
rules which concern specific types of property such as hospitals and places where the 
sick and wounded are collected,5 or which indirectly protect civilian property.6 The 
purpose behind imposing a criminal sanction for these offenses is not to protect 
property but rather to punish the indiscriminate conduct of the perpetrator and to 
protect the civilian population from the consequences of such conduct. This confirms 
once more that the prevailing objective of IHL and ICL rules devoted to the 
protection of civilian property is the prevention of suffering of the civilian population 
and not of the protection of property in itself.7  Therefore, the articulation of a 
civilian-use model for determining the calculation of damages caused to certain 
civilian goods is the most appropriate means of fulfilling the purpose behind the 
protection of property in IHL. 
Although the “protected property” model is attractive in theory, there are 
some potential pitfalls to its implementation. The authors stress that one of the core 
elements of the model is calculating damages caused to civilian property using a fixed 
sum for every individual affected by the damages in a given “catchment area” in 
addition to the replacement costs for the items destroyed. On the other hand they 
                                                
3 See S.C. Res. 827, art. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (“extensive destruction and 
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly”); S.C. Res. 827, art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (“b) wanton 
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; c) 
attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or 
buildings; . . . e) plunder of public or private property”).   
4 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(a)(iv), 8(2)(b)(xiii), (xvi), 
8(2)(e)(xii), (v), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].  For a detailed 
analysis of war crimes against property, see GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 334–41 (2005). 
5 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 8(2)(b)(ix). This article is devoted to specially protected 
objects such as “buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, 
historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided 
they are not military objectives.”  
6 Id., arts. 8(2)(b)(ii)–(v), (ix), (xxiv), 8(2)(e)(ii). 
7 In International Criminal Law as well, however, the civilian-use value is not the only rationale 
for the protection of property and, in some cases, the idea of ownership prevails.  See WERLE, 
supra note 4. 
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affirm that this “does not necessarily entail that money will be paid out to individual 
claimants,” but that “the policy reasons underlying the use of fixed-sum amounts are 
equally compelling regardless of whether the fixed sum is used to calculate the 
amount due to individual victims, or the amount due to a government that has 
espoused the individual claims.”8 
By allowing such sums to be paid to the government rather than individuals, 
this model circumvents one of the most crucial problems concerning the application 
of IHL: the lack of effective remedies for victims. Does it really make sense to apply 
the civilian-use model and to determine a compensation award that includes a fixed 
sum for each individual affected by the damages caused to a hospital, for example, 
where the claim is put forward by a State that may eventually decide not to 
redistribute compensation to the individual victims (even those directly affected such 
as hospital patients)? This model remains an abstract exercise in calculation if it is not 
accompanied by an obligation for States to reallocate the sum awarded for the 
compensation of damages to the individual victims. The effectiveness of the model 
depends on the requirement that States pay out the fixed-sum quotas to the victims.   
According to prevailing opinion, individuals do not have a directly 
enforceable right to compensation for damages paid as a result of an IHL violation. 
Admittedly, balanced and effective solutions can hardly be reached through the 
individualization of compensation mechanisms,9 as the authors themselves underline. 
However, there is a significant trend to recognize that individuals may benefit from 
rights that derive from international law,10 and the individual right to restitution and 
compensation for the victims of IHL violations has been the object of growing 
attention by the United Nations and other organizations.11 These rights deserve to be 
carefully taken into consideration.  
In conclusion, in those cases where a competent body has a mandate to 
award damages, or where formerly belligerent states are attempting to reach an 
agreement for post-war reparations, the civilian-use model for compensating for 
                                                
8 Brilmayer & Chepiga, supra note 1, at 435 n.99. 
9 Some of the problems that hinder the individualization of compensation mechanism were 
very clearly set out by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, with 
reference to Article 3 of the Hague Convention IV.  Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Rep., 726 F. 2d 
774, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
10 See INT’L. COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 
8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 1056–57 (1987) (“Apart 
from exceptional cases, persons with a foreign nationality who have been wronged by the 
unlawful conduct of a Party to the conflict should address themselves to their own 
government, which will submit their complaints to the Party or Parties which committed the 
violation. However, since 1945 a tendency has emerged to recognize the exercise of rights by individuals.” 
(emphasis added)). 
11 It is impossible to refer to all relevant documents adopted on this topic by various U.N. 
bodies. It suffices here to refer to the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law 
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005). 
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damages caused to civilian property could play an important role in a correct and fair 
calculation of the damages to be paid. However, the significance of this role depends 
on the condition that the fixed-sum quotas used for calculation are eventually 
reallocated to the victims. This would be the only way to respect the spirit of IHL 
provisions protecting civilian property and to respect victims’ rights to restitution and 
compensation: to ensure that those who were primarily affected by the destruction of 
a certain good, that is to say those who would have benefited from the use of that 
property for their survival, are effectively compensated for the damages they have 
suffered.   
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